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Abstract 
In imperfect democracies, does political competition always improve the provision of 
public goods? Studying the provision of public goods in 74 Russian regions between 2004-2009 
provides an opportunity to test this hypothesis. Results show that governors appointed by the 
federal government provide more public goods (in this case, education and health care) than 
governors drawn from local elites who were reappointed by the federal government when there 
is competition in the legislature. But in cases where the ruling party is strong (virtual monopoly) 
or when party share is low enough that governors can do little to raise party support, governors 
with local ties provide more public goods. These effects diverge from the predictions of the 
previous literature. This non-monotonic (inverted U-relationship) between public goods 
provision and initial party share suggests that formal mechanisms of accountability 
(administrative subordination to the central government) work worse under political monopoly, 
while informal mechanisms (such as local ties and strong networks) work worse under political 
competition to encourage public goods spending. 
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Introduction 
What institutional mechanisms best motivate politicians to work in favor of society? And 
do mechanisms of political accountability that work in developed states also promote social 
welfare in less open societies? Although we have an increasing body of evidence that greater 
openness and political competition generally results in better incentives for those in office, it 
does not necessarily follow that increases in political competition are always and everywhere 
unambiguously beneficial to society, particularly in autocracies. 
Does political competition matter for public policies under conditions of unfair elections 
and autocracy? Will political competition lead to more socially desirable outcomes or the reverse 
in such states? Given that most of the world lives under systems that are far from being the 
“inclusive” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012) or “open-access” societies (North, Wallis, and 
Weingast, 2009) that leading scholars claim best promote human welfare, the relationship 
between political competition and public welfare emerges as a critical issue for political 
economy.  
For instance, Besley and Burgess (2002) show that greater political competition leads to 
greater calamity expenditures. And Careaga and Weingast (2002) claim that higher levels of 
political competition result in policies with lower levels of corruption and greater provision of 
public goods. Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010) develop a model applied to the United States 
that shows political competition has quantitatively important positive effects at the state level. 
On the other hand, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) make clear that the link between political 
competition and growth promoting policy is non-monotonic; under certain conditions, moving 
from a low level to an intermediate level of political competition might lead to growth-inhibiting 
behavior even if the overall link between openness and good policy is positive.
3
 This is 
especially true for countries where the political culture is not fully democratic.  
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 A similar dynamic is argued by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009). 
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While most of the literature has focused on the impact of political competition on growth 
promoting policies, little attention is paid to the impact of political competition on public goods 
provision, especially under autocratic regimes. They also do not integrate this issue with the 
question of what motivates different types of bureaucrats in such regimes. This paper attempts to 
fill those gaps in the literature.  
There is no unambiguous view about the relative benefits of policies implemented by 
officials with ties to local elites. Some scholars argue that officials captured by local elites 
pursue only the goals of the business elites, resulting in waste and corruption (Bardhan, 2002; 
Sonin, 2010). Work by Bardhan and Mooherjee (2000) and Slinko et al. (2005) consider the 
conflicts between local vs. national elites in terms of state capture. The role of political and fiscal 
centralization is also at the forefront in the work of Enikopolov and Zhuravskaya (2007) in a 
cross country study of public goods provision. 
In contrast, Zhuravskaya and Persson (2011) find that Chinese governors who built their 
careers within the province they govern and have strong ties with local elites, provide more 
public goods than those from governors who came from another province. We develop this idea 
and try to show that impact of officials’ career path on the policies they choose non-
monotonically depends on the intensity of political competition.  
We address this issue using data from Russia from a period that has seen a large 
transformation of political institutions and changes in the intensity of political competition in a 
single decade. It allows us to gauge whether formal (administrative subordination and career 
concerns) or informal (networking) mechanisms of accountability work better with different 
levels of competition. As we will see, new governors with no local ties that were appointed by 
the federal government behave differently than those governors that were reappointed by the 
state but who had been previously elected and already had preexisting ties to the local elite. 
Although both types of governors need to maintain a certain level of support for the ruling 
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national party in order to remain in office, there is a non-monotonic effect of party share on 
public goods provision depending on governor type. 
There are numerous studies of governors and their policies in Russian before 2005. 
Notably, Frye et al. (2011) examined in detail the importance of election versus appointment by 
the central government in influencing the quality of governors. Their work focuses on the 
backgrounds of governors who were elected or appointed between 1992 and 2010 to understand 
variance in selection but even they conclude that selection choice only explains a small part of 
this. Our paper’s contribution is to show that governors’ policy differences are driven by the 
interaction between the different instruments available to them to raise party share and the initial 
share of the ruling party. 
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the historical background 
that led to the new 2005 system. Section 3 introduces the conceptual framework that motivates 
the model in Section 4, which contains our estimation results. Our conclusions are presented in 
Section 5. 
 
2. Background 
It has been well documented that in the 1990s Russia had a highly decentralized political 
system with a weak federal government and strong regional elites, representing mostly local big 
business
4
. From 1995-2005 all governors in the Russian Federation were elected by the 
inhabitants of the region they governed. Governors could be replaced only after the term of their 
mandates expired. The federal government could neither appoint nor replace regional heads.  
Regional legislatures were formed by majoritarian rule. Each region was divided into 
several electoral districts, inhabitants of which elected their representatives to the regional 
parliament. At the same time, national political parties were weak with weak party discipline 
whereas regional legislatures were controlled by local elites, and/or local political parties were 
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 See Sonin (2003), Slinko et al. (2005), Zhuravskaya (2010) etc.  
7 
 
created to represent the interests of local big business. Thus, local but not federal elites 
dominated both in the legislative and in the executive branches of the Russian regions and they 
exclusively made decisions over budget spending. They also bargained with federal elites over 
federal transfers.  
As soon as Vladimir Putin became President of the Russian Federation, several 
remarkable changes in the laws concerning elections and political parties were made.  
First, in 2001 the law regulating political parties’ activities was changed. According to 
the new law, political parties had to prove that they had at least 10,000 members. They also 
needed to have branches in each region of the Russian Federation. Moreover in at least 50% of 
the regions, parties had to have at least 500 members, and at least 250 proven members in the 
remaining regions. If any of these requirements were violated, the political party could not exist, 
nor participate in any kind of elections. Thus this law effectively eliminated most regional 
political parties. All political parties had to meet these requirements by the summer of 2003. In 
2005 a new law required that political parties had to prove they had no fewer than 50,000 
members. These further changes in the law resulted in a dramatic decline of the number of 
political parties. At the end of 2003 there were 44 political parties in Russia, but by the spring of 
2009 only 7 survived and only 4 of them took part in regional elections.  
Second, the new elections law required that as of July 2003, in elections to the regional 
legislature, no less than 50% of representatives had to be elected from party lists. Thus, in 
regional elections majoritarian rule was replaced by a mixed-proportional rule. Some regions 
went further and in 2007 rejected the mixed-proportional rule in favor of a fully proportional 
voting system. Taking into account that by 2003-2004 the ruling party “United Russia”5 was 
completely dominant among national parties at the federal level, the requirement of 50% of the 
representatives coming from political party lists gave the ruling party the chance to gain control 
                                                 
5
 “United Russia” was created on December 1, 2001 and included 3 political parties namely “Unity” («Единство»), 
“Fatherland” («Отечество») and “All Russia” (“Вся Россия»). “United Russia” won federal elections to State 
Duma (National Parliament) on December 7, 2003 and got the constitutional majority. It was the first successful 
attempt to create a ruling party in Russia. The previous attempt to create such a national ruling party in the 90s - the 
so called “Our home is Russia” (“Наш дом Россия”) party – failed.  
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over regional legislatures
6
. The new rules for regional legislatures began on the 7
th
 of December 
2003. The date of the next elections embodying these new rules was made dependent on the date 
of the previous elections (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Number of regional legislatures elected by new voting rules 
 
 
Third, in October 2004 President V. Putin decided that after 2005, direct election of 
governors would be replaced by appointments made by the President of the Russian Federation. 
Since that time, the President could appoint and replace governors as he wished. In order to 
legitimize decisions about replacement and appointments of governors, criteria for the evaluation 
of governors’ performance was created in 2007 and since then has been dramatically changed 
several times
7
. However in practice the system was not used for this purpose. When deciding 
about governors’ appointment or replacement, the federal government seemed to show little 
                                                 
6
 Since this time Russian electoral statistics contain data concerning the political parties’ structure of representatives 
in regional legislatures.  
7
 The first attempt to create such a system was made in 2005 when the criteria included 30 indicators, but this 
system of evaluation was not based on a law. In 2007 a new system including 77 indicators of regional performance 
was created and based on federal law. Later on criteria were increased again up to 460 indicators. In 2012 it was 
discussed that the number of indicators should be reduced to 12.  
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concern for the social and economic situation in the region, whereas success in both federal and 
regional elections was the most important factor for reappointment
8
.  
Thus, since 2005 there are three types of governors: 
1) Elected governors whose terms have not yet expired (so-called politicians); 
2) Reappointed governors who were elected before the new system was put in place (so-
called old bureaucrats); 
3) Appointed governors who had never been elected before (so-called new bureaucrats). 
Figure 2 illustrates the structure of governors since 2004. 
 
 
Figure 2. Structure of Russian governors by type 
 
 
If we look at the structure of incentives for the different types of governors, we can see 
that the first two types are very close. Both elected governors and reappointed governors who 
were elected earlier had two principals: local elites (which helped them to be elected before and 
who might have been bribed to give the appointments) and federal elites (which could appoint or 
replace them at any moment). We will no longer distinguish between old bureaucrats and 
governors-politicians, because they have similar incentives. Unlike them, newly appointed 
governors – the new bureaucrats who had never been elected -- have only one principal and one 
                                                 
8
 See e.g., Turovskii (2009), Golosov (2008) and Sharafutdinova (2010). 
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contract with the federal elites. They have few connections and owe no obligations to the local 
elite. Often, they do not even bother to move their families to the region and move back and 
forth from Moscow. We will refer to the first two types as Old Governors. The ones who were 
only appointed and had not stood for election will be referred to as New Governors.  
It should also be mentioned that by 2005 almost all tax resources were redistributed 
through the federal budget, while regional governments were in charge of mostly social 
expenditures. That is why most regional budgets were running a deficit and were badly 
dependent on transfers from the federal budget
9
. 
Thus, by 2005 federal elites and the President himself had created a regional political 
system designed to force local elites to share rents with the federal government as well as to 
force them to provide desirable results for all kinds of elections, especially at the federal level.  
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
We use a simple framework to analyze the political conditions which 
encourage/discourage governors from providing public goods. We adopt a slightly modified 
version of the theoretical framework first proposed by Persson and Zhuravskaya (2011). This 
should not be seen as a complete formal model of the process but merely serves as a theoretical 
illustration of the primary hypotheses to be tested. 
Governors can spend public funds in three ways: on public goods (g), appropriation in 
their own favor (e) and appropriation in favor of the local elite (j).  
Spending on public goods g benefits the region as well as its residents (population). The 
benefit function is given by y = f (g) + ε, where f(g) is an increasing linear function and ε is a 
random variable describing the uncertainty of the size of the benefit generated by a given level of 
public spending.  
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 Zhuravskaya (2010). 
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Regional resources extracted by a governor in his own favor e, generate no social benefits 
but yield private benefits t(e) to that politician. We assume that t(e) is an increasing linear 
function. Similarly, regional resources extracted by a governor in favor of the local elite j, 
generate no social benefits but yield private benefits b(j) to the local elite.  
Normalizing total resources to 1, the resource constraint is thus 1 = g + e + j.   
The general population (residents of a region) cares only about spending on public goods 
g and their utility is maximized when all resources are spent on public goods 1 = g. 
The local elite benefits not only from funds appropriated in their favor by governors, but 
also from public goods g as soon as they live in a region and can desire some level of public 
goods, which is less than the level of public goods desired by inhabitants.  
Governors benefit from being reappointed as well as from spending public funds in their 
own favor; they must decide on how to allocate resources between g, j and e.  
Recall that there are two types of governors - “new bureaucrats” and “old bureaucrats”. A 
“new governor” (“new bureaucrat”) NG who is appointed by the Federal government and totally 
unbeholden to local interests, cannot benefit from the local elite and has no incentives to bribe it. 
He decides how to allocate resources between g and e.  
An “old governor” OG who got elected before new appointments were instituted, may 
have been appointed or waiting for appointment. For him to have succeeded means that he relied 
on the support of the local elite but to keep going, he must please the Federal government. Thus, 
he decides how to allocate resources between g, j and e.  
First consider a new governor, NG. The probability of his reappointment depends on the 
interests of the Federal government, namely desirable results of elections
10
 (high share of the 
                                                 
10
 The importance of electoral results for governors’ appointment or replacement as well as the weak effect of 
regional performance is well documented (see e.g. Turovskii, 2009; Golosov, 2008). This suggests that when 
deciding about governors’ appointment or replacement, the federal government shows little concern for the social 
and economic situation locally.  
There is some work attempting to make a quantitative assessment of the factors crucial for the renewal and 
replacement of governors (Reuter and Robertson, 2011; Reisinger and Moraski, 2011). None of this work 
contradicts the presumption of weak regional effects. 
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ruling party) s which is dependent on the effects of his public goods spending g as well as a 
parameter s0, reflecting initial conditions in terms of support of the ruling party by residents in 
his region. As long as an increase of g results in an increase of f(g) and benefits residents, it leads 
to an increase of the support of the ruling party. So we assume that the probability of his 
reappointment S(s0, g) is linear in s0 and a concave in g: Sg(s0, g) > 0, Sgg(s0, g) < 0. We also 
assume that S(s0,0) = s0 which implies that if a governor does not spend on public goods, he 
cannot increase the share of the ruling party and his chances to be reappointed. To be 
reappointed, he must ensure that the share of the ruling party s, exceeds some target level s , 
where 0 < s  < 1. We also assume that S(0, g) < s , which implies that if there is no initial 
support of the ruling party, then public resources will not be sufficient to reach s . 
Thus, a new governor NG with no local interests chooses g and e to maximize his utility 
function: 
U
NG
 = Pr ( ss   )+ t(e) = Pr ( )+ t(e)       (1) 
subject to the budget constraint 
1 = e + g.           (2) 
We now turn to the behavior of “old governors”. Like new governors, old governors 
derive utility from the probability of being reappointed and the benefits from appropriating 
public funds, e. Unlike for new governors, however, their probability of being reappointed 
depends not only on residents’ (population) support, but also on the support of the local elite11. 
So the probability of reappointment Pr (   s,,0 jgsS ) is driven by spending on public goods g, 
support from local elites and the initial share of the ruling party s0. We assume that the support of 
the local elites is driven by transfers or bribes j from the governors to those elites. We assume 
that only old governors can use the local elite to provide the required voters.
12
 Thus old 
                                                 
11
 Local elites might help OGs to achieve the required share of the ruling party e.g. through cheating on elections. 
12
 This assumption seems natural in light of the well documented difficulties new governors have with local elites 
(e.g. Turovskii, 2009). Moreover, there have been cases when new governors were replaced because they were not 
able to get good relations with local elites (Amur oblast and Irkutsk oblast in 2008). New governors’ problems with 
  s,0 gsS
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governors can use two technologies to ensure a target level s . They can either spend more on 
public goods g to get support of residents or bribe the local elite (j) which might help them to 
cheat with elections. Thus their probability of being appointed is a function for initial conditions 
s0, spending on public goods g and bribing of local elite j. We assume Sg(s0, g, j) > 0, 
Sgg (s0, g, j )< 0, Sj(s0 ,g, j) > 0, Sjj(s0, g, j) < 0, Sgj(s0, g, j ) > 0
13
 , S(s0 ,0, 0) = s0 and S(0, g, j) 
< s . We assume also that for given s0, the Hessian of the function S(s0 ,g, j) is negative definite, 
that is .  
Moreover we assume that old governors benefit somewhat from public goods provision g 
as soon as they live in the region they govern for long time and their families also live there
14
.  
Thus their utility function is: 
U
OG
 = Pr (   s,,0 jgsS ) + t(e) + U
population 
= Pr (   s,, 0 sjgS ) + t(e) + nf(g)  (3) 
where 0 < n << 1 is a factor which takes into account the fact that the volume of public goods 
desired by the local elite is much smaller, than the volume of public goods desired by residents 
(inhabitants). 
So an OG will maximize U
OG
 by choosing the level of public spending, rents for himself 
and for the local elites that satisfy his budget constraint 
1 = e + j + g.          (4) 
It should be mentioned that we are not interested in how a governor redistributes 
resources between j and e, we are interested in how he redistributes between g and (j + e) since 
                                                                                                                                                             
local elite might have different roots, such as their lack of experience and/or lack of respect from the local 
population. Another reason is that the local elite might have a patron representing one group of interests in the 
federal elite, while a new governor could be part of another group of interests. These groups of special interests 
might compete with each other for federal and regional funds, political power, etc. So appointment of a new 
governor might mean the victory of one group of special federal interests over another. Local elites and their patrons 
could not prevent such appointments but sometimes could organize scandals in media or strong opposition in a 
regional legislature or simply not help new governors with elections. In turn, a new governor tries to grab local 
business and control over state funds – partly for himself, partly in favor of his interest groups. At any rate, it is 
simply more costly for new governors to get local support. 
13 
It implies that these two technologies of providing a required share of the ruling party are complements, that is if 
both technologies are used together, they give more votes than if used separately. 
14
 Unlike OG, NG often lived in a different region and their families often stay there.  
       jgsSjgsSjgsSjgsS jggjjjgg ,,,,,,,, 0000 
14 
 
only g matters for the wellbeing of inhabitants not how the governor and local elite share public 
funds between themselves.  
We now derive the following three propositions the results of which will be tested in 
Section 4. 
Proposition 1. If s0 → 0, then gNG < gOG. 
Proof. If s0 → 0, then Pr (   s,0 gsS )→ 0 and a new governor NG will spend nothing on 
g but appropriates everything. His utility function reaches the maximum when U
NG
 = t(e). An 
old governor OG will provide some public goods g to benefit from public goods for himself 
because of the term nf(g) in his utility function Thus, a new governor will provide fewer public 
goods than an old governor: gNG < gOG . 
Proposition 2. If s0 → 1 , then gNG < gOG. 
Proof. If s0 → 1, then Pr(   s,0 gsS ) → 1 and NG will spend nothing on g but 
appropriates everything, his utility function reaches the max when U
NG
 = 1 + t(e). Unlike NG, 
OG provides some public goods g: U
OG
 = 1+ t(e) +nf(g). Thus gNG < gOG ,  
Proposition 3. If 0 < s0 < 1, then gNG > gOG .  
Proof . If 0 < s0 < 1, then 0 < Pr <1 and to ensure s , OG can use two technologies to get 
the desired share of the ruling party, namely providing public goods g as well as bribing local 
elite j, whereas NG can use only one technology through public goods provision. Because 
probability functions for NG are concave in g (Sg(s0,g) > 0, Sgg(s0,g) < 0 for NGs as well for OG 
as Sg(s0, g, j) > 0, Sgg(s0,g,j)<0 for OGs), and taking into account that the Hessian of the OG’s 
function S(s0, g, j) is negative definite for given s0, then to get the equal level of probability, NG 
must spend more on g than OG, because OG can split between j and g. So a marginal ruble spent 
on g and j by OG will give more additional s (especially taking into account that Sg,j(s0,g,j) > 0), 
than a marginal ruble spent on g by NG. Thus gNG > gOG . 
The relationships between the initial share of the ruling party and public goods provision 
for the two types of governors are shown in Figure 3.  
15 
 
Figure 3. Relations between share of the ruling party and public goods for OGs and NGs 
 
 
4. Model specification and estimation results 
4.1. Data  
To test the hypotheses outlined above, we estimate the relationship between public goods 
provision, the share of the ruling party and governors’ career paths (“new governors” vs “old 
governors”). We collected data for 74 Russian regions for 2004-200915, resulting in an 
unbalanced panel with 216 year*region observations
16
. 
Data on economic performance and spending on public goods come from Rosstat. Data 
on political variables are collected by the authors from the database of the Central Election 
Commission of the Russian Federation, from the Russian Inter-Regional Electoral Support 
                                                 
15
 The list of the Russian regions we take into consideration is in Appendix A. It is worth mentioning that in 2001 
the Russian Federation had 89 regions – subjects of the Federation. By 2009 the Russian Federation includes only 
83 regions. Some of the region during 2005-2008 were included in other regions and stopped existing as a subject of 
the Russian Federation, so we do not take them into consideration. We also excluded Chechen Republic as well as 
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug because Rosstat does not provide data 
for all periods for them. Moreover we do not include Kemerovo Oblast because in this region there were no 
elections using the new voting system before October 2008. This means that elected by new rules legislature could 
not effect budget spending for 2009. Also we do not include the Tuva Republic and Sverdlovsk Oblast which have 
two chambers in their legislatures.  
16
 The number of observations is determined by date of elections in regional legislatures. In some regions elections 
using the new voting system took place in 2003, in others this happened only in 2007. Thus, if the voting in a region 
was only in 2007, there are observations for 2004-2006, and if elections took place in 2005, we have no data for 
2004. The date of elections using the new voting rule was dependent on the date of previous elections and on the 
date where the term for a legislature expired. Moreover due to a budget process, a legislature or a governor can 
influence only budget spending which occurs at least one year after elections or appointment. Furthermore if 
elections or appointment took place after September, then a new governor or a new legislature could affect budget 
spending only two years later, since decisions were taken by their predecessors.  
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Network and from other sources. Data on governors’ characteristics such as their age, mostly 
business vs. political background, time of keeping governor’ office, insiders or outsiders 
(resident/nonresident) of the regions they govern are also collected by the author from official 
biographies of Russian governors as well as from other open sources like magazines and 
newspapers. A summary of these data appears in Appendix B. 
It should be mentioned, that Russian electoral statistics contain data concerning which 
political party represents deputies only for the new voting systems with mixed-proportional or 
proportional voting rules. Results of elections by the majoritarian rule do not include data 
concerning elected deputies and the political parties to which they belong.  
Dependent variables. We follow Enikolopov and Zhuravaskaya (2007), Zhuravskaya 
and Persson (2011) and consider two types of public goods–education and health care17. In both 
cases, we focus mostly on inputs, because we want to look at the motivation and efforts of the 
regional tier of government, whereas outcomes and outputs are dependent not only on the efforts 
of the regional government but also on those of the federal government, especially in health 
care
18
. Multiple sources of public education and health care funding make the task of identifying 
the effects of each source on outcomes (e.g. infant mortality rate or quality of education) very 
difficult. This problem becomes more intractable taking into account the heavily unbalanced data 
with only 3-4 year time series for most regions. Moreover if in the first year a decision to spend 
some money on education or health care was made, then the next year it was funded and only in 
the third year would the very first signs of the impact of spending possibly occur if at all. Thus, 
while we might think that examining the effects of spending would be very useful that is a 
separate and formidable challenge outside the scope of the current paper. 
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 Enikopolov and Zhuravskaya (2007), Zhuravskaya and Persson (2011) also look at infrastructure.  
18
 Funding of public health care in Russian regions has four primary sources – state obligatory health care insurance 
funds, the federal budget, regional budgets, and municipal budgets. 
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For public education services, we use the share of education spending in the total 
spending of regional budgets as well as public spending per student (for ages 0 to 18
19
) as 
measures of education inputs. For both input measures we have data for all periods.  
It is worth mentioning that Russia suffers from a declining population and a decreasing 
number of children. Some regions suffer more from this, others less. In general, a low number of 
students per teacher as well as a low number of students per class may result from the lack of 
demand due to small cohorts of children rather than from state policy. 
When studying public health care, we treat public spending on health care as well as the 
share of health care in total spending of regional budgets as measures of inputs. We should 
mention that the share of health care spending is a much less representative for health care 
inputs, because it is heavily determined by the size of regional budgets as well as other types of 
public spending. Health care spending in per capita terms might increase while the share 
decreases.  
Political variables. To describe the situation in the executive branch of a region, we use 
a dummy capturing the differences between appointed governors who have never been elected 
(new governors) and old governors (see Figure 1 above). 
For the legislative branch, we use two measures of the intensity of political competition: 
the share of seats of the national ruling party “United Russia” as well as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). We note that the HHI is heavily dependent on requirements concerning 
the minimum number of votes for a political party to get a seat in regional legislatures. It varies 
from 3% of all voters to 10%.  
The main limitation of this empirical strategy is that before 2004 there was a majoritarian 
election rule in Russia, and Russian electoral statistics do not contain information about the 
political party that a candidate represented. Therefore we can only control for political 
competition in regional legislatures since 2004. As mentioned before, governors (or a legislature) 
                                                 
19
It should be noted that regional budgets are also responsible for public kindergartens.  
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can influence budget spending only in the year after they took office. Thus if they were elected 
or appointed they can adopt a budget for the next year but not for the current year. Moreover, 
when elections or an appointment take place in the fourth quarter of the year, then they can affect 
the budget only after two years.  
We deal with an unbalanced panel, because the elections adopting new voting rules took 
place only after the expiration of the mandates of representatives. This happened at different 
moments in different regions. 
Since the stylized model predicts a non-monotonic effect of political competition on 
spending, we include linear and quadratic interaction terms between the dummy for new as well 
as for old governors and the share of the “United Russia” party. 
We run two types of regressions. In the first type of specification, we include both 
quadratic and linear interaction terms, while in second type we use only linear interaction terms. 
We run both types of regressions because we have only 33 observations for which the share of 
the ruling party is less than 35%. The other 183 observations have higher values and 129 among 
these are higher than 50%. Therefore, we may not be able to estimate with much confidence the 
whole curve predicted by the theoretical model described in Section 3 (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of observations according to share of the ruling party 
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Economic control variables. We use regional total budget spending as well as the share 
of federal transfers in total regional public revenues as control variable
20
s. Households’ money 
income is used to control for differences between rich and poor regions. All variables are in 
constant 2003 prices.  
Governors’ background control variables. We follow Zhuravskaya et al. (2011) here 
and control for governors’ age, their mostly business vs. political background21, time during 
which they were holding the governor’s office, whether they were insiders or outsiders 
(resident/nonresident of the regions they govern) in order to ensure that the difference between 
governors’ decisions comes from different contracts which implies different incentives, not 
because people with different life experience or at different ages make different decisions (see 
Appendix C). We do not use the governors’ scientific degrees because almost all of Russian 
governors have PhD in one or more fields, however many, if not most of these PhD degrees were 
simply bought and not earned. 
Descriptive statistics for all variables appear in Appendix D. 
4.2. Estimation strategy  
In order to test the above stated hypotheses, we run the following fixed effects model: 
       
         (5)                                                                                               176
)(54)()(3)(2)(1
ittiktiktikti
ktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktiktitiit
XssNG
sNGNGssOGsOGOGg






 
where subscript i stands regions and subscript t for years; subscript k = 1 if an appointment or 
election took place between January and September, while k = 2 – if an appointment or election 
                                                 
20
 There was no direct link between federal and local spending on education as the federal government finances 
mostly higher level education, whereas primary and secondary education is financed primarily by municipal public 
budgets. Unlike spending on primary and secondary education, funding of public health care in regions have four 
primarily sources – state obligatory health care insurance fund, federal budget, regional budgets and municipal 
budgets. These types of public funds finance different types of healthcare expenditures and there is no almost their 
overlapping. 
21
 Since most of the politicians in Russia have their own business (firms) or they have their interest (explicitly or 
implicitly) in business groups, one can’t say definitely for a given governor whether political activity or business is 
his main activity.  
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took place between October and December; git is a measure of public goods provision (g in the 
model of Section 3); sit is a measure of political competition in a regional parliament (s0 in the 
theoretic model of Section 3); OGit is a dummy for old governors, NGit is a dummy for new 
governors; Xit is a vector of control variables, which includes regional public spending per capita, 
the share of federal transfers in total regional public revenues as well as governors’ education 
and career path indicators. We also control for regions and year fixed effects (αi and ρt).
22
  
For the cases of inputs as dependent variables we run both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
and Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) to estimate the model and correct for possible 
correlations between error terms and recover more efficient estimates 
To check for robustness, we use two measures of the intensity of political competition in 
regional legislatures: the share of the ruling party and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.  
4.3. Estimation results  
4.3.1. Baseline results  
 
Propositions 1 – 3 suggest that we should find that the curve of expenses of public goods 
for new governors lies below the curve of public goods for old governors when the share of the 
ruling party is either too big or too small, whereas new governors spend more on public goods 
than old governors when this share takes intermediate values. Since we expect a concave shape 
for spending on public goods, the sign of the coefficient picked up by the linear interaction term 
(quadratic interaction term) should be positive (negative). The intercept coefficients should be 
close to zero. 
In most Russian regions one observes a high share for the ruling party (more than 35%); 
therefore, a negative sign on interaction terms in linear specifications is also possible. Our 
baseline results (when SUR is used) for inputs of public goods are presented in Figures 5 and 6, 
and in Table 1. Appendix E contains estimation results for OLS for the all considered measures 
of public goods. 
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 For linear specifications we run following model: git = αi+ρt+β1OGi(t-k)+β2OGi(t-k)si(t-k)+ β3NGi(t-k)+ β4NGi(t-k)si(t-k)+ 
β5Xit+εit 
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We first consider quadratic specifications. In the specification where spending on 
education per capita is the dependant variable, we find expected statistically significant signs for 
the interaction terms. The maximum of spending on education per capita in regions with new 
governors is reached when the share of the ruling party is 44%.
23
  
However, we fail to find statistically significant coefficients for old governors. 
Nevertheless our empirical findings are reasonably consistent with the model presented in 
Section 3. We find that if the share of the “United Russia” party is small or large (less than 19% 
or more than 61%), than new governors spend less on education in per capita terms than new 
governors, whereas if this share is not too big or too small (between 19% and 61%), then new 
governors spend more on public goods than old governors.  
Though the point estimates go in the right direction and confirm the model of Section 3, 
we find that the confidence bands illustrated in Figure 5 are quite large, and recover each other 
except in the region of large shares of the ruling party (above 70%). 
Figure 5. Spending on education per capita as a function of the share of the ruling party 
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 Maximum of the function: -20.92 + 49.49s0 – 55.93s0
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In the specification where the dependent variable is the share of spending on education, 
we find that new governors spend a higher share of public funds than old governors, but the 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero. See Table 1 and Appendix F, Figure 1. 
For health care per capita as the dependent variable, all political variables have expected 
signs and all interaction terms are significant at the 5 – 10 % level (see Table 1). This gives some 
evidence supporting our hypothesis about the shape of spending on public goods for both types 
of governors. Moreover we find evidence in favor of Propositions 1 and 2 from Section 3, 
whereas we fail to find evidence for Proposition 3 (see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. Spending on health care per capita as a function of the share of the ruling party 
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Thus, for both cases of spending on education and health care in per capita terms, we 
have some evidence that supports Propositions 1 and 2. In the case of spending on education we 
also find empirical support for Proposition 3, while in the case of spending on health care we 
find the expected shape of the curve not only for new governors, but also for old governors.  
 
Table 1. Quadratic specifications for spending on education and health care 
 
Per capita Share of 
spending on 
education 
spending on 
health care 
spending on 
education 
spending on 
health care 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy for old governor  
28.55 *** 
(8.01) 
0.70 
(3.42) 
39.49*** 
(5.10) 
29.97*** 
(6.64) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for old 
governor 
9.60 
(15.55) 
15.54**  
(6.80) 
-5.84 
(10.10) 
45.72*** 
(13.17) 
Share of the ruling party x Share of the ruling 
party x Dummy for old governor 
-5.97 
(14.37) 
-13.02** 
(6.28) 
11.11 
(9.33) 
-37.45*** 
(12.17) 
Dummy for new governor 
31.95*** 
(8.55) 
2.09 
(3.64) 
41.62*** 
(5.64) 
41.20*** 
(7.35) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for new 
governor  
49.49*** 
(14.55) 
10.26* 
(6.36) 
-15.94* 
(9.45) 
1.77 
(12.32) 
Share of the ruling party x Share of the ruling 
party x Dummy for a new governor
 
-55.93*** 
(15.14) 
-12.92** 
(6.62) 
17.56* 
(9.84) 
-2.26 
(12.82) 
Households income per capita 
-0.87 
(2.55) 
1.40 
(1.11) 
-5.12*** 
(1.66) 
-4.09* 
(2.16) 
Regional budget revenues per capita 
0.35 
(1.46) 
-0.52 
(0.65) 
-3.46*** 
(0.96) 
-5.39*** 
(1.25) 
Share of federal transfers 
-15.02 
(3.32) 
-1.04 
(1.45) 
-1.34 
(2.16) 
3.12 
(2.81) 
Age of governor 
-0.004 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.18*** 
(0.07) 
Dummy for businessman 
-3.14 
(1.40) 
0.22 
(0.61) 
1.69* 
(0.91) 
-0.84 
(1.18) 
Time keeping office 
0.05 
(0.13) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.09) 
0.30 
(0.11) 
Dummy for governor-outsider 
-0.75 
(0.77) 
1.35*** 
(0.34) 
0.82 
(0.50) 
0.86 
(0.65) 
Region fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 216 216 216 216 
 
In Table 2, we consider linear specifications. We find the expected negative signs on the 
interaction terms between the share of the ruling party and the dummy for new governors for 
both spending on education and on health care as well as for both per capita and share terms 
(except for spending on education per capita). But the interaction terms are never statistically 
24 
 
significantly different from zero
24
. Thus, slope for new governors is negative: the bigger the 
share of the ruling party the less they spend on public goods. Moreover, if the share of the ruling 
party is over than 30%,
25
 then new governors spend less on public goods than old governors, 
whereas if the share of the ruling party is smaller, then old governors spend more on public 
goods, which is consistent with our model. However the sign of the coefficient for the interaction 
between the dummy for old governors and the share of the ruling party is positive. This implies 
that the bigger the share of the ruling party the more they spend on public goods.  
 
Table 2. Linear specifications for spending on education and health care 
 
Per capita Share of 
spending on 
education 
spending on 
health care 
spending on 
education 
spending on 
health care 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy for old governor  
28.55*** 
(8.01) 
0.70 
(3.41) 
38.16*** 
(5.05) 
33.10*** 
(6.72) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for old 
governor 
7.49*** 
(2.67) 
2.13* 
(1.14) 
5.08*** 
(1.69) 
4.34* 
(2.24) 
Dummy for new governor 
31.94*** 
(8.55) 
2.09 
(3.64) 
39.40*** 
(5.39) 
36.65*** 
(7.17) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for new 
governor  
-2.79 
(2.79) 
-2.09 
(1.19) 
0.70 
(1.76) 
-1.24 
(2.34) 
Households income per capita 
-0.96 
(2.64) 
1.41 
(1.13) 
-5.11*** 
(1.67) 
-4.01* 
(2.22) 
Regional budget revenues per capita 
-0.13 
(1.52) 
-0.45 
(0.65) 
-3.45*** 
(0.96) 
-4.85*** 
(1.28) 
Share of federal transfers 
-13.66 
(3.38) 
-0.36 
(1.44) 
-2.06 
(2.13) 
4.35 
(2.83) 
Age of governor 
-0.01  
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.11* 
(0.06) 
Dummy for businessman 
-1.67 
(1.37) 
0.16 
(0.58) 
1.55* 
(0.86) 
-2.06* 
(1.15) 
Time keeping office 
-0.08 
(0.13) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
0.11 
(0.08) 
0.31*** 
(0.11) 
Dummy for governor-outsider 
-0.13 
(0.78) 
1.34*** 
(0.33) 
0.74 
(0.49) 
0.41 
(0.65) 
Region fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 216 216 216 216 
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 At the same time regressions with the following specification git = αi+ρt+β1NGi(t-k)+ β2 si(t-k)+ β3 NGi(t-k) si(t-k)+ 
β4Xit+εit, give us interaction terms, which are significant at 1-2% level for all measures of spending on education and 
health care. See Appendix K. 
25
 If the share of the “United Russia” party is higher than 33%, then old governors spend more on education and 
health care in per capita terms than new governors. If the share of “United Russia” is higher than 29%, then in 
regions with old governors the share of spending on education in total budget spending is bigger than in regions with 
new governors, whereas for a share of spending on health care the critical value of the ruling party is 58%. 
25 
 
 
4.3.2. Robustness checks and discussion  
To check whether our results might be sensitive to outliers, we constructed Figures 1 and 
2 in Appendix G. There are two regions, which might be considered to be outliers. This is the 
Moscow oblast in 2008 for the case of the spending on education and Chukotka in 2007 for the 
case of the spending on health care. 
To check whether our results are sensitive to outliers, we exclude the observation for the 
Moscow oblast in the case of spending on education per capita and run regressions with 215 
observations. Results are presented in Figure 7 and Appendix H.  
For the case of spending on health care we exclude the observation for Chukotka in 2007 
and run regressions with 215 observations. Results are presented in Figure 8 and Appendix H. As 
can be seen, our finding concerning the shape of old’ governors spending on health care is not 
sensitive to excluding these observations.  
To check whether our results are sensitive to the way in which we measure the intensity 
of political competition, we replace the share of the ruling party by a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI), estimated for shares of political parties in regional legislatures. Results of 
estimation presented in Appendix I are similar to our baseline results with the share of “United 
Russia” only. 
Finally, we use logarithms for spending on education and health care in per capita terms. 
In the quadratic specifications, we fail to find any evidence supporting Propositions 1 – 3. For 
linear specifications, we obtain results that might be seen supporting Propositions 2 – 3, even 
though coefficients for health care spending are not statistically different from zero. See 
Appendix J.  
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Figure 7. Spending on education per capita as a function of the share of the ruling party 
(excluding the Moscow oblast in 2008) 
 
Figure 6. Spending on health care per capita as a function of the share of the ruling party 
  (excluding Chukota in 2007) 
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The problem of reverse causality is an important challenge for estimating true effects. 
One may suppose that if old governors spend a lot on public goods, they will be appointed by the 
Federal government, while if they spend a little, they will not be able to keep their office. This 
implies that governors who do not spend enough on public goods are more likely to be replaced. 
This may imply that it is not the type of governor and their incentives which affects the level of 
spending on public goods, but the level of spending has an effect on whether a governor is 
reappointed or not. To address this issue we used lagged explanatory variables. 
Of course this still doesn’t strictly rule out the possibility that appointments are primarily 
driven by spending itself. An appropriate and rigorous identification technique is not readily 
apparent, particularly given the short period of the time series. However, expert claims in the 
literature indicate that when considering the appointment issue, the federal government seems to 
care about neither the social spending nor the social performance of a region but only about the 
formal electoral support of the ruling party
26
. While not definitive, these opinions support our 
view that the way governors are appointed determines the size of social spending, and not vice 
versa. Of course, it is still that the case that more effort needs to be made in future research to 
eliminate the possibility of reverse causation. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have tried to answer the question of how political competition affects 
public goods provision in nations with poorly-developed democratic institutions. We argue that 
political competition matters even in a limited democracy. But the intensity of political 
competition defines what types of accountability mechanisms (formal vs. informal) work better 
in favor of residents, and their impact is non-monotonic. We find some evidence for our 
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 For instance, Gel’man and Ryzhenkov (2011) consider “vertical power” as the tool used to provide the Kremlin’s 
desired electoral results, but this tool is not connected with solving the regions’ and cities’ problems. Turovskii 
(2009) also supports this view that the social and economic performance of a region is not truly used as a criterion 
for a governor’s reappointment or replacement. 
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hypotheses by using data from Russian regions for 2004 - 2009. We show that in regions in 
which the political power of one party is very important, increased administrative subordination 
of executives is associated with fewer public goods such as expenses on public health care and 
public education. In contrast, informal mechanisms of accountability of local executives (such as 
networking or local political pressure) often work worse in heavily competitive environments.  
Moreover, we find that the relationship between the intensity of political competition, 
efficiency of accountability mechanisms, and public goods (such as education and health care) 
are not monotonic with locally elected officials providing more goods than centrally appointed 
governors when the ruling party is strong and the opposite effect when the share of the ruling 
party is low. In the future it may also be possible to examine whether these differences in public 
policy have objective differences in local outcomes, but this will require many more years to 
verify given policy lags.  
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Appendix A. List of 74 Russian regions, included in our sample 
 
Altai Krai Kursk Oblast Sakha Republic 
Amur Oblast Leningrad Oblast Republic of North Ossetia-Alania 
Arkhangelsk Oblast Lipetsk Oblast Republic of Tatarstan 
Astrakhan Oblast Magadan Oblast Republic of Khakassia 
Belgorod Oblast Moscow Oblast Rostov Oblast 
Bryansk Oblast Murmansk Oblast Ryazan Oblast 
Vladimir Oblast Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Samara Oblast 
Volgograd Oblast Novgorod Oblast Saratov Oblast 
Vologda Oblast Novosibirsk Oblast Sakhalin Oblast 
Voronezh Oblast Omsk Oblast Smolensk Oblast 
federal city of Moscow Oryol Oblast Stavropol Krai 
federal city of St. Petersburg Penza Oblast Tambov Oblast 
Jewish Autonomous Oblast Perm Krai Tver Oblast 
Ivanovo Oblast Primorsky Krai Tomsk Oblast 
Irkutsk Oblast Pskov Oblast Tula Oblast 
Kabardino-Balkar Republic Republic of Adygea Tyumen Oblast 
Kaliningrad Oblast Altai Republic Udmurt Republic 
Kaluga Oblast Republic of Bashkortostan Ulyanovsk Oblast 
Karachay-Cherkess Republic Buryat Republic Khabarovsk Krai 
Kamchatka Krai Republic of Ingushetia Chelyabinsk Oblast 
Kirov Oblast Republic of Kalmykia Zabaykalsky Krai 
Kostroma Oblast Republic of Karelia Chuvash Republic 
Krasnodar Krai Komi Republic Chukotka Autonomous Okrug 
Krasnoyarsk Krai Mari El Republic Yaroslavl Oblast 
Kurgan Oblast Republic of Mordovia  
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Appendix B. Data summary 
 
Indicator Description 
Age of governor  
Age of a governor in a region. Source: Data are collected by author from 
open sources. 
Dummy for new governor 
Dummy for governors-“new bureaucrats”, who have never been elected 
but only appointed by federal government (new governors) (1) or 
governors - “old bureaucrats” (old governors) (0). Source: Data are -
collected by author from open sources 
Dummy for businessman  
Dummy for governors who have mostly business background (1) or 
political background (0). Source: Data are collected by author from open 
sources 
Dummy for governor-outsider 
Dummy for Governor is an outsider (nonresident of the region he/she 
governs) (1) or an insider (resident of a region) (0). Source: Data are 
collected by author from open sources 
HHI 
Logarithm of the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, estimated for political 
parties in a regional legislature. Source of primary data: Russian Inter-
Regional Electoral Support Network (http://db.irena.org.ru/). 
Households income per capita 
Logarithm of households money income per capita in a region, in 
constant 2003 prices. Source: Rosstat (http://www.gks.ru). 
Infant mortality rate 
Number of deaths of children at age 0-1 year per 1000 births in a region. 
Source: Rosstat (http://www.gks.ru) 
Number of computers  
Number of computers in public schools per 100 students in a region. 
Source: Rosstat (http://www.gks.ru) 
Number of inhabitants per bed 
Number of inhabitants per a bed in public hospitals in a region. Source: 
Rosstat (http://www.gks.ru)  
Number of inhabitants per 
doctor 
Number of inhabitants per a doctor in a region. Source: Rosstat 
(http://www.gks.ru) 
Number of students per class 
Number of students per class in public schools in a region. Source: 
Rosstat (http://www.gks.ru) 
Regional budget revenues per 
capita  
Logarithm of regional budget revenues per capita in constant 2003 
prices. Source: Rosstat (http://www.gks.ru). 
Share of federal transfers  
Share of current federal transfers in total revenues of regional budgets. 
Source: Rosstat (http://www.gks.ru). 
Share of spending on education 
Share of spending on education in a total regional budget spending. 
Source: Rosstat (http://www.gks.ru) 
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Share of spending on health 
care 
Share of spending on health care in a total regional budget spending. 
Source: Rosstat (http://www.gks.ru) 
Share of the ruling party 
Share of seats of the national ruling party – “United Russia” in a total 
number of seats in a regional legislature allocated by voting for party 
lists. Source: Russian Inter-Regional Electoral Support Network 
(http://db.irena.org.ru/). 
Spending on education per 
capita 
Spending of regional budgets on education per a person at age from 0 till 
18 years, in constant 2003 prices. Source: Rosstat (http://www.gks.ru) 
Spending on health care per 
capita 
Spending of regional budgets on health care per capita, in constant 2003 
prices. Source: Rosstat (http://www.gks.ru) 
Time in office 
Time, during which a governor keeps the office. Source: Data are 
collected by author from open sources. 
Total mortality rate 
Number of deaths per 1000 inhabitants in a region. Source: Rosstat 
(http://www.gks.ru) 
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Appendix C. Governors’ characteristics 
 
 
Figure 1. Share of the governors-outsiders (non-residents) in total number of Russian governors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Share of the governors with mostly political background (not businessmen) in total 
number of Russian governors 
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Figure 3. Average time during which Russian governors keep their offices (in years) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Average age of Russian governors (in years) 
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Appendix D. Descriptive statistics  
 
   Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Obs. 
Age of governor  54.2 75.0 34.0 7.8 216 
Dummy for new governor 0.2 1.0 0.0 0.4 216 
Dummy for businessman  0.8 1.0 0.0 0.4 216 
Dummy for governor-outsider 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.4 216 
HHI 3723.6 8915.4 1584.5 1707.7 216 
Households income per capita 6.9 24.0 1.9 3.3 216 
Infant mortality rate 9.3 31.4 4.5 3.2 216 
Number of computers  3.8 8.2 1.2 0.9 127 
Number of inhabitants per bed 97.8 253.2 41.4 27.6 216 
Number of inhabitants per doctor 226.7 432.1 114.4 56.3 216 
Number of students per class 17.0 30.0 11.0 3.1 137 
Regional budgets revenues per capita  21.5 224.3 7.5 24.0 216 
Share of federal transfers  0.4 0.9 -0.2 0.2 216 
Share of spending on education 23.5 33.3 11.4 3.8 216 
Share of spending on health care 14.2 23.2 3.1 3.6 216 
Share of the ruling party 0.5 0.9 0.2 0.2 216 
Spending on education per capita 23.3 130.1 1.6 20.6 216 
Spending on health care per capita 2.8 17.9 1.0 1.9 216 
Time keeping office 7.6 20.0 1.0 5.3 216 
Total mortality rate 14.9 21.7 3.1 3.1 216 
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Appendix E. Specifications for outputs and outcomes as the dependant variables with share of  
the ruling party as a proxy for intensity of political competition  
in regional legislatures 
 
Table 1. Quadratic specifications for spending on health care and education with share of the  
ruling party as a proxy for intensity of political competition in regional 
legislatures 
 
 
 
 
Spending on  
education health care  
per capita 
as a share of 
total spending 
per capita 
as a share of 
total spending 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy for old governor 
26.75*** 
(10.27) 
39.49*** 
(6.67) 
-0.68 
(4.49) 
29.98*** 
(8.70) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for old 
governor 
9.60 
(20.36) 
-5.84 
(13.23) 
15.54** 
(8.90) 
45.72*** 
(17.24) 
Share of the ruling party x Share of the ruling 
party x Dummy for old governor  
-5.97 
(18.81) 
11.11 
(12.22) 
-13.02 
(8.22) 
-37.45** 
(15.93) 
Dummy for new governor 
20.92* 
(11.36) 
41.62*** 
(7.38) 
1.11 
(4.97) 
41.20*** 
(9.62) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for new 
governor 
49.49*** 
(19.05) 
-15.94 
(12.38) 
10.26 
(8.33) 
1.77 
(16.13) 
Share of the ruling party x Share of the ruling 
party x Dummy for new governor 
-55.93*** 
(19.83) 
17.56 
(12.88) 
-12.92 
(8.67) 
-2.26 
(16.79) 
Households income per capita 
-0.87 
(3.35) 
-5.12** 
(2.17) 
1.40 
(1.46) 
-4.09 
(2.82) 
Regional budget revenue per capita 
0.35 
(1.93) 
-3.46*** 
(1.26) 
-0.52 
(0.85) 
-5.39*** 
(1.64) 
Share of federal transfers 
-15.02*** 
(4.35) 
-1.34 
(2. 83) 
-1.04 
(1.90) 
3.12 
(3.69) 
Age of governor 
-0.004 
(0.10) 
-0.04 
(0.07) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.18** 
(0.09) 
Dummy for businessman governor 
-3.14* 
(1.83) 
1.69 
(1.19) 
0.22 
(0.80) 
-0.84 
(1.55) 
Time in office 
0.05 
(0.17) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
0.30** 
(0.15) 
Dummy for governor-outsider 
-0.75 
(1.01) 
0.82 
(0.66) 
1.35*** 
(0.44) 
0.86 
(0.85) 
Region fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 216 216 216 216 
R
2
: within 0.59 0.50 0.27 0.72 
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Table 2. Linear specifications for spending on health care and education with share of the ruling 
party as a proxy for intensity of political competition in regional legislatures 
 
 
 
 
Spending on  
education health care  
per capita 
as a share of 
total spending 
per capita 
as a share of 
total spending 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy for old governor  
28.55*** 
(10.41) 
38.16*** 
(6.56) 
0.70 
(4.44) 
33.10*** 
(8.73) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for old 
governor 
7.49** 
(3.47) 
5.08*** 
(2.20) 
2.13 
(1.48) 
4.34 
(2.91) 
Dummy for new governor 
31.95*** 
(11.10) 
39.40*** 
(7.00) 
2.09 
(4.73) 
36.65*** 
(9.31) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for new 
governor 
-2.79 
(3.63) 
0.70 
(2.29) 
-2.09 
(1.55) 
-1.24 
(3.04) 
Households income per capita 
0.96 
(3.44) 
-5.11** 
(2.17) 
1.41 
(1.46) 
-4.01 
(2.88) 
Regional budget revenues per capita 
-0.13 
(1.98) 
-3.45*** 
(1.24) 
-0.45 
(0.84) 
-4.85*** 
(1.66) 
Share of federal transfers 
-13.66*** 
(4.39) 
-2.06 
(2.77) 
0.36 
(1.87) 
4.35 
(3.68) 
Age of governor 
0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
Dummy for businessman 
-1.67 
(1.77) 
1.55 
(1.12) 
0.16 
(0.76) 
-2.06 
(1.49) 
Time keeping office 
0.08 
(0.13) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
-0.01 
(0.07) 
0.31** 
(0.15) 
Dummy for governor-outsider 
-0.13 
(1.01) 
0.74 
(0.64) 
1.34*** 
(0.43) 
0.41 
(0.85) 
Region fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 216 216 216 216 
R
2
: within 0.56 0.49 0.25 0.70 
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Table 3. Quadratic specifications for education outputs with share of the ruling party as a proxy 
for intensity of political competition in regional legislatures 
 
 
Number of students 
per class 
Number of 
computers 
(1) (2) 
Dummy for old governor 
21.08 
(12.76) 
1.98 
(2.12) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for old governor  
-12.29 
(13.76) 
2.87 
(3.87) 
Share of the ruling party x Share of the ruling party x Dummy 
for old governor  
3.32 
(12.01) 
-2.14 
(3.49) 
Dummy for new governor 
15.22 
(14.98) 
1.35 
(2.28) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for new governor  
13.13 
(18.72) 
4.77 
(5.02) 
Share of the ruling party x Share of the ruling party x Dummy 
for new governor 
-18.07 
(22.46) 
-2.14  
(4.88) 
Households income per capita 
1.25 
(1.95) 
-0.79 
(0.65) 
Regional budget revenues per capita 
-0.41 
(2.09) 
0.62 
(0.40) 
Share of federal transfers 
2.64 
(3.62) 
1.35 
(1.10) 
Age of governor 
-0.04 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Dummy for businessman 
-0.74 
(4.51) 
-0.07 
(0.57) 
Time keeping office 
0.05 
(0.10) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
Dummy for governor-outsider 
-0.66 
(1.13) 
0.01 
(0.26) 
Region fixed effect yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes 
Number of observations 137 127 
R
2
: within 0.33 0.83 
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Table 4. Linear specifications for education outputs with share of the ruling party as a proxy for 
intensity of political competition in regional legislatures 
 
 
Number of students per class Number of computers 
(2) (3) 
Dummy for old governor  
26.22** 
(10.25) 
1.83 
(2.01) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for old 
governor 
-8.31*** 
(1.93) 
0.60 
(0.57) 
Dummy for new governor 
24.16** 
(10.20) 
1.17 
(2.17) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for new 
governor 
-1.68 
(1.71) 
2.65*** 
(0.69) 
Households income per capita 
0.88 
(1.88) 
-0.80 
(0.62) 
Regional budget revenues per capita 
-0.13 
(2.03) 
0.66* 
(0.37) 
Share of federal transfers 
2.15 
(3.53) 
1.62* 
(0.95) 
Age of governor 
-0.08 
(0.09) 
-0.001 
(0.02) 
Dummy for businessman 
-4.10** 
(2.02) 
-0.09 
(0.36) 
Time keeping office 
0.08 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Dummy for governor-outsider 
-0.94 
(1.00) 
0.000 
(0.19) 
Region fixed effect yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes 
Number of observations 137 127 
R
2
: within 0.32 0.83 
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Table 5. Quadratic specifications for health care outputs and outcomes with share of the ruling  
party as a proxy for intensity of political competition in regional legislatures 
 
 
Health care outputs Health care outcomes 
number of 
inhabitants per 
a doctor 
number of 
inhabitants 
per a bed 
total 
mortality 
rate 
infant 
mortality 
rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy for old governor 
290.49*** 
(26.36) 
130.20*** 
(21.76) 
13.28*** 
(1.59) 
3.79 
(8.27) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for old 
governor  
106.12** 
(47.25) 
20.97 
(43.15) 
4.24 
(3.14) 
29.13* 
(16.39) 
Share of the ruling party x Share of the ruling 
party x Dummy for old governor  
-105.89** 
(43.66) 
-31.26 
(39.87) 
-3.61 
(2.90) 
-35.32** 
(15.14) 
Dummy for new governor 
281.41*** 
(23.83) 
132.94*** 
(24.07) 
15.36*** 
(1.75) 
2.37 
(9.14) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for new 
governor  
62.85 
(44.21) 
15.67 
(40.38) 
-7.33*** 
(2.94) 
28.81* 
(15.33) 
Share of the ruling party x Share of the ruling 
party x Dummy for new governor 
-63.07 
 (46.01) 
-27.83 
(42.02) 
8.64*** 
(3.06) 
-37.67** 
(15.96) 
Households income per capita 
-0.44 
(7.44) 
10.26 
(7.07) 
0.21 
(0.51) 
-2.62 
(2.68) 
Regional budget revenues per capita 
-8.64* 
(4.49) 
-16.05*** 
(4.10) 
-0.14 
(0.30) 
-1.74 
(1.56) 
Share of federal transfers 
-2.73 
(10.10) 
-2.14 
(9.22) 
0.19 
(0.67) 
5.59 
(3.50) 
Age of governor 
-0.35 
(0.24) 
-0.11 
(0.22) 
-0.003 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
Dummy for businessman 
1.46 
(4.24) 
-0.23 
(3.87) 
0.44 
(0.28) 
3.89*** 
(1.47) 
Time keeping office 
0.41 
(0.40) 
0.08 
(0.37) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.19 
(0.14) 
Dummy for governor-outsider 
1.50 
(2.34) 
-0.56 
(2.14) 
0.14 
(0.16) 
2.62*** 
(0.81) 
Region fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 216 216 216 216 
R
2
: within 0.25 0.69 0.74 0.52 
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Table 6. Linear specifications for health care outputs and outcomes with share of the ruling party 
as a proxy for intensity of political competition in regional legislatures 
 
 
Health care outputs Health care outcomes 
number of 
inhabitants per 
a doctor 
number of 
inhabitants 
per a bed 
total 
mortality 
rate 
infant 
mortality 
rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy for old governor  
291.61*** 
(25.39) 
133.42*** 
(21.30) 
13.38*** 
(1.66) 
7.58 
(8.30) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for old 
governor 
-6.29 
(7.94) 
-11.47 
(7.11) 
-0.47 
(0.55) 
-7.02*** 
(2.77) 
Dummy for a new governor 
289.59*** 
(23.39) 
134.62*** 
(22.73) 
13.05*** 
(1.77) 
5.59 
(8.85) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for new 
governor 
1.52 
(8.29) 
-11.02 
(7.42) 
0.64 
(0.58) 
-7.16** 
(2.89) 
Households income per capita 
-0.31 
(7.86) 
10.29 
(7.03) 
0.24 
(0.55) 
-2.61 
(2.74) 
Regional budget revenues per capita 
-7.68* 
(4.52) 
-15.86*** 
(4.04) 
-0.003 
(0.31) 
-1.58 
(1.57) 
Share of federal transfers 
1.95 
(10.04) 
-0.56 
(8.98) 
0.13 
(0.70) 
7.50** 
(3.50) 
Age of governor 
-0.14 
(0.23) 
-0.05 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.08) 
Dummy for businessman 
-0.32 
(4.06) 
-0.47 
(3.63) 
0.06 
(0.28) 
3.80*** 
(1.42) 
Time keeping office 
0.29 
(0.40) 
0.02 
(0.36) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.21** 
(0.14) 
Dummy for governor-outsider 
0.93 
(2.31) 
-0.62 
(2.07) 
-0.02 
(0.16) 
2.63*** 
(0.81) 
Region fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 216 216 216 216 
R
2
: within 0.22 0.69 0.70 0.49 
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Appendix F. Figures of spending on education and health care in share terms 
 
 
Figure 1. Share of spending on education in total public spending as a function of the share of the 
ruling party  
 
 
Figure 2. Share of spending on health care in total public spending as a function of the share of 
the ruling party  
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Appendix G. Figures of spending on education and health care per capita  
with labels of regions and years for observations 
 
Figure 1. Spending on education per capita as a function of the share of the ruling party 
(with labels of regions and years for observations) 
 
Figure 2. Spending on health care per capita as a function of the share of the ruling party 
(with labels of regions and years for observations) 
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Appendix H. Estimations with 215 observations  
(excluded Moscow oblast 2008 and Chukotka 2007)  
 
Table 1. Quadratic specifications for spending on education and health care with 215  
observations (for spending on education Moscow oblast 2008 is excluded,  
while for spending on health care Chukotka 2007 is excluded) 
 
 
 
 
spending on education per 
capita 
27
 
spending on health 
care per capita 
28
 
(1) (2) 
Dummy for old governor 
25.22*** 
(9.14) 
-0.29 
(1.89) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for old governor 
9.45 
(18.12) 
15.48*** 
(3.75) 
Share of the ruling party x Share of the ruling party x 
Dummy for old governor 
-6.51 
(16.74) 
-12.75*** 
(3.46) 
Dummy for new governor 
19.41* 
(10.11) 
3.82* 
(2.09) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for new governor 
48.94*** 
(16.95) 
-0.46 
(3.53) 
Share of the ruling party x Share of the ruling party x 
Dummy for new governor 
 
-56.28*** 
(17.64) 
1.14 
(3.69) 
Households income per capita 
1.07 
(2.99) 
-0.10 
(0.62) 
Regional budget revenues per capita 
0.28 
(1.72) 
0.33 
(0.36) 
Share of federal transfers 
-15.87*** 
(3.88) 
1.34* 
(0.81) 
Age of governor 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
Dummy for businessman 
-3.13* 
(1.63) 
0.08 
(0.34) 
Time keeping office 
0.04 
(0.15) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
Dummy for governor-outsider 
-0.74 
(0.90) 
0.08 
(0.19) 
Region fixed effect yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes 
Number of observations 215 215 
R
2
: within 0.65 0.38 
 
                                                 
27
 No Moscow oblast for 2008 
28
 No Chukotka for 2007 
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Appendix I. Estimations with Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a proxy for intensity of political  
competition in regional legislatures 
 
Table 1. Quadratic specifications for spending on health care and education with Herfindahl- 
Hirschman Index as a proxy for intensity of political competition in regional 
legislatures 
 
 
Spending on education Spending on health care 
per capita 
as a share of 
total 
spending 
per capita 
as a share of 
total 
spending 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy for old governor 
-176.66 
(267.00) 
273.28 
(175.90) 
-124.24 
(116.20) 
-313.81 
(227.74) 
HHI x Dummy for old governor  
49.19 
(65.77) 
-59.39 
(43.33) 
29.93 
(28.82) 
83.13 
(56.10) 
HHI x HHI x Dummy for old governor  
-2.89 
(4.03) 
3.72 
(2.65) 
-1.77 
(1.77) 
-4.93 
(3.44) 
Dummy for new governor 
-870.83*** 
(316.96) 
220.61 
(208.81) 
-197.03 
(138.89) 
40.01 
(270.35) 
HHI x Dummy for new governor  
224.96*** 
(78.87) 
-45.61 
(51.96) 
49.75 
(34.56) 
-1.03 
(67.27) 
HHI x HHI x Dummy for new governor  
-13.97*** 
(4.88) 
2.81 
(3.21) 
-3.12 
(2.14) 
0.05 
(4.16) 
Households income per capita 
-0.46 
(3.38) 
-4.78** 
(2.23) 
1.32 
(1.48) 
-4.59 
(2.89) 
Regional budget revenues per capita 
-0.10 
(1.92) 
-3.29*** 
(1.26) 
-0.41 
(0.84) 
-4.75*** 
(1.64) 
Share of federal transfers 
-15.09*** 
(4.36) 
-1.42 
(2.87) 
-0.90 
(1.91) 
3.07 
(3.72) 
Age of governor 
-0.03 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
Dummy for businessman 
-3.77* 
(1.94) 
1.33 
(1.28) 
0.05 
(0.85) 
-0.60 
(1.66) 
Time keeping office 
0.09 
(0.18) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.23* 
(0.16) 
Dummy for governor-outsider 
-0.83 
(1.02) 
0.69 
(0.67) 
1.29*** 
(0.45) 
0.84 
(0.87) 
Region fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 216 216 216 216 
R
2
: within 0.59 0.48 0.26 0.71 
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Table 2. Linear specifications for spending on health care and education with Herfindahl- 
Hirschman Index as a proxy for intensity of political competition in regional 
legislatures 
 
 
Spending on education Spending on health care 
per capita 
as a share of 
total 
spending 
per capita 
as a share of 
total 
spending 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy for old governor 
2.76 
(13.63) 
27.19*** 
(8.69) 
-8.57 
(5.78) 
16.57 
(11.32) 
HHI x Dummy for old governor 
3.28 
(1.55)** 
1.27 
(0.99) 
1.17* 
(0.66) 
2.23* 
(1.29) 
Dummy for new governor 
35.17** 
(15.58) 
37.51 
(9.93) 
5.26 
(6.61) 
38.29*** 
(12.95) 
HHI x Dummy for new governor  
-0.93 
(1.53) 
-0.11 
(0.97) 
-0.62 
(0.65) 
-0.35 
(1.27) 
Households income per capita 
-1.23 
(3.49) 
-4.78** 
(2.22) 
1.21 
(1.48) 
-4.34 
(2.90) 
Regional budget revenues per capita 
0.08 
(1.98) 
-3.27*** 
(1.26) 
-0.38 
(0.84) 
-4.81 
(1.65) 
Share of federal transfers 
-14.13*** 
(4.44) 
-2.07*** 
(2.83) 
-0.52 
(1.88) 
3.79 
(3.69) 
Age of governor 
0.04 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.004 
(0.04) 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
Dummy for businessman 
-1.35 
(1.79) 
1.64 
(1.14) 
0.30 
(0.76) 
-1.86 
(1.49) 
Time keeping office 
-0.13 
(0.18) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.08) 
0.29* 
(0.15) 
Dummy for governor-outsider 
0.04 
(1.02) 
0.76 
(0.65) 
1.38*** 
(0.43) 
0.48 
(0.85) 
Region fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 216 216 216 216 
R
2
: within 0.55 0.47 0.25 0.71 
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Table 3. Quadratic specifications for education outputs with Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a  
proxy for intensity of political competition in regional legislatures 
 
 
Number of students per class Number of computers 
(1) (2) 
Dummy for old governor  
122.81 
(153.77) 
-4.87 
(47.98) 
HHI x Dummy for old governor  
-16.78 
(36.58) 
1.42 
(11.93) 
HHI x HHI x Dummy for old governor  
0.67 
(2.22) 
-0.08 
(0.73) 
Dummy for new governor 
23.26 
(262.24) 
79.22 
(80.26) 
HHI x Dummy for new governor  
3.48 
(65.05) 
-20.03 
(20.12) 
HHI x HHI x Dummy for new governor  
-0.28 
(4.07) 
1.28 
(1.23) 
Households income per capita 
2.01 
(1.80) 
-0.53 
(0.69) 
Regional budget revenues per capita 
0.44 
(1.87) 
0.60 
(0.40) 
Share of federal transfers 
3.00 
(3.31) 
1.08 
(1.07) 
Age of governor 
-0.25** 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
Dummy for businessman 
-7.53** 
(3.00) 
0.43 
(0.58) 
Time keeping office 
0.21** 
(0.10) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
Dummy for governor-outsider 
-1.95* 
(1.01) 
0.20 
(0.26) 
Region fixed effect yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes 
Number of observations 137 127 
R
2
: within 0.46 0.82 
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Table 4. Linear specifications for education outputs with Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a  
proxy for intensity of political competition in regional legislatures 
 
 
Number of students per class Number of computers 
(1) (2) 
Dummy for old governor 
76.92*** 
(13.08) 
1.70 
(2.35) 
HHI x Dummy for old governor 
-5.77*** 
(0.94) 
0.13 
(0.28) 
Dummy for new governor 
39.72*** 
(10.35) 
-4.15 
(3.16) 
HHI x Dummy for new governor  
-0.89 
(0.62) 
0.90*** 
(0.32) 
Households income per capita 
1.91 
(1.69) 
-0.78 
(0.67) 
Regional budget revenues per capita 
0.46 
(1.81) 
0.58 
(0.39) 
Share of federal transfers 
2.75 
(3.13) 
1.24 
(1.00) 
Age of governor 
-0.23*** 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Dummy for businessman 
-7.59*** 
(2.03) 
-0.15 
(0.39) 
Time keeping office 
0.20** 
(0.09) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
Dummy for governor-outsider 
-1.86** 
(0.92) 
0.02 
(0.20) 
Region fixed effect yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes 
Number of observations 137 127 
R
2
: within 0.46 0.81 
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Table 5. Quadratic specifications for health care outputs and outcomes with Herfindahl- 
Hirschman Index as a proxy for intensity of political competition in 
regional legislatures 
 
 
Health care outputs Health care outcomes 
number of 
inhabitants per 
a doctor 
number of 
inhabitants 
per a bed 
total 
mortality 
rate 
infant 
mortality 
rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy for old governor  
-1055.09* 
(617.05) 
-814.21 
(556.89) 
-4.27 
(42.47) 
-427.63* 
(217.82) 
HHI x Dummy for old governor  
332.89** 
(152.00) 
237.04* 
(137.18) 
4.35 
(10.46) 
109.26** 
(53.66) 
HHI x HHI x Dummy for old governor  
-20.47** 
(9.31) 
-14.86* 
(8.40) 
-0.27 
(0.64) 
-6.86** 
(3.29) 
Dummy for new governor 
-24.83 
(732.51) 
-523.07 
(661.09) 
109.09** 
(50.41) 
-443.90* 
(258.58) 
HHI x Dummy for new governor  
78.140 
(182.27) 
166.78 
(164.50) 
-24.08* 
(12.54) 
113.69* 
(64.34) 
HHI x HHI x Dummy for new governor  
-4.79 
(11.27) 
-10.63 
(10.17) 
1.51* 
(0.78) 
-7.20* 
(3.98) 
Households income per capita 
-1.00 
(7.82) 
10.91 
(7.06) 
0.16 
(0.54) 
-2.53 
(2.76) 
Regional budget revenues per capita 
-7.77** 
(4.43) 
-15.80*** 
(4.00) 
0.01 
(0.31) 
-1.62 
(1.56) 
Share of federal transfers 
-1.29 
(10.07) 
-2.03 
(9.09) 
0.19 
(0.69) 
6.78 
(3.55) 
Age of governor 
-0.22 
(0.23) 
-0.09 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
Dummy for businessman 
3.62 
(4.49) 
1.01 
(4.05) 
0.43 
(0.31) 
4.00*** 
(1.58) 
Time keeping office 
0.19 
(0.43) 
-0.04 
(0.38) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.24 
(0.15) 
Dummy for governor-outsider 
2.04 
(2.36) 
-0.41 
(2.13) 
0.10 
(0.16) 
2.58*** 
(0.83) 
Region fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 216 216 216 216 
R
2
: within 0.25 0.70 0.72 0.50 
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Table 6. Linear specifications for health care outputs and outcomes with Herfindahl-Hirschman  
Index as a proxy for intensity of political competition in regional legislatures 
 
 
Health care outputs Health care outcomes 
number of 
inhabitants per 
a doctor 
number of 
inhabitants 
per a bed 
total 
mortality 
rate 
infant 
mortality 
rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy for old governor  
311.15*** 
(31.03) 
170.36*** 
(27.63) 
15.32*** 
(2.15) 
24.76** 
(10.87) 
HHI x Dummy for old governor  
-2.37 
(3.54) 
-5.57* 
(3.15) 
-0.23 
(0.25) 
-2.55** 
(1.24) 
Dummy for new governor 
291.30*** 
(35.49) 
169.92*** 
(31.60) 
11.66*** 
(2.46) 
24.16* 
(12.43) 
HHI x Dummy for new governor 
0.30 
(3.48) 
-5.37* 
(3.10) 
0.25 
(0.24) 
-2.74** 
(1.22) 
Households income per capita 
-0.30 
(7.94) 
10.95 
(7.07) 
0.27 
(0.55) 
-2.66 
(2.78) 
Regional budget revenues per capita 
-7.96* 
(4.51) 
-15.83*** 
(4.02) 
-0.02 
(0.31) 
-1.59 
(1.58) 
Share of federal transfers 
1.88 
(10.11) 
0.54 
(9.00) 
0.17 
(0.70) 
3.88*** 
(1.43) 
Age of governor 
-0.19 
(0.22) 
-0.03 
(0.20) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
0.08 
(0.08) 
Dummy for businessman 
-0.51 
(4.08) 
-0.38 
(3.63) 
0.02 
(0.28) 
3.88*** 
(1.43) 
Time keeping office 
0.34 
(0.40) 
-0.06 
(0.36) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.30** 
(0.14) 
Dummy for governor-outsider 
0.86 
(2.32) 
-0.75 
(2.06) 
-0.03 
(0.16) 
2.59*** 
(0.81) 
Region fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 216 216 216 216 
R
2
: within 0.64 0.22 0.70 0.48 
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Appendix J. Estimations with logarithm of spending as a dependant variable 
 
Table 1. Quadratic and liner specifications for logarithm of spending on health care and 
education per capita 
 
 
Logarithm of spending on 
education per capita 
Logarithm of spending on 
health care per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy for old governor 
2.11*** 
(0.26) 
2.27*** 
(0.32) 
-0.93 
(0.62) 
0.11 
(0.74) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for old 
governor 
0.33*** 
(0.09) 
0.46 
(0.63) 
0.39 
(0.23) 
4.27*** 
(1.46) 
Share of the ruling party x Share of the ruling 
party x Dummy for old governor 
- 
-0.09 
(0.58) 
- 
-3.47*** 
(1.35) 
Dummy for new governor 
2.25*** 
(0.27) 
2.44*** 
(0.35) 
-0.62 
(0.65) 
1.15 
(0.82) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for new 
governor  
0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.59) 
-0.01 
(0.24) 
0.40 
(1.38) 
Share of the ruling party x Share of the ruling 
party x Dummy for new governor
 - 
0.19 
(0.61) 
- 
-0.20 
(1.44) 
Households income per capita 
0.06 
(0.10) 
0.06 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.27) 
-0.01 
(0.27) 
Regional budget revenues per capita 
0.20*** 
(0.06) 
0.20*** 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
-0.02 
(0.15) 
Share of federal transfers 
0.06 
(0.13) 
0.07 
(0.13) 
0.36 
(0.34) 
0.22 
(0.35) 
Age of governor 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Dummy for businessman 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.11 
(0.14) 
-0.04 
(0.15) 
Time keeping office 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
Dummy for governor-outsider 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.08 
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
Region fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 216 216 216 216 
R
2
: within 0.84 0.84 0.31 0.35 
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Appendix K. Linear specifications for spending on education and health care  
(with one dummy for new governors) 
 
Table 1. Linear specifications for spending on education and health care with a share of the  
ruling party as a proxy for intensity of political competition in regional 
legislatures 
 
 
Spending on education Spending on health care 
per capita 
as a share of 
total spending 
per capita 
as a share of 
total spending 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Share of the ruling party 
7.49** 
(3.47) 
5.08** 
(2.19) 
2.13 
(1.48) 
4.34 
(2.91) 
Dummy for new governor 
3.40* 
(1.49) 
1.24 
(1.13) 
1.39* 
(0.76) 
3.54** 
(1.50) 
Share of the ruling party x Dummy for new 
governor  
-10.28*** 
(3.00) 
-4.37** 
(1.89) 
-4.22*** 
(1.28) 
-5.58** 
(2.52) 
Households income per capita 
0.96 
(3.44) 
-5.11** 
(2.17) 
1.41 
(1.46) 
-4.01 
(2.88) 
Regional budget revenues per capita 
-0.13 
(1.98) 
-3.45*** 
(1.24) 
-0.45 
(0.84) 
-4.85*** 
(1.66) 
Share of federal transfers 
-13.66*** 
(4.39) 
-2.06 
(2.77) 
0.36 
(1.87) 
4.35 
(3.68) 
Age of governor 
0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
Dummy for businessman 
-1.67 
(1.77) 
1.55 
(1.12) 
0.16 
(0.76) 
-2.06 
(1.49) 
Time keeping office 
0.08 
(0.13) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
-0.01 
(0.07) 
0.31** 
(0.15) 
Dummy for governor-outsider 
-0.13 
(1.01) 
0.74 
(0.64) 
1.34*** 
(0.43) 
0.41 
(0.85) 
Region fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 216 216 216 216 
R
2
: within 0.56 0.49 0.25 0.70 
 
